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RELUCTANT WARRIOR, ENTHUSIASTIC PEACEKEEPER:
DOMESTIC LEGAL REGULATION OF CANADIAN
PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICTS*
Ikechi Mgbeoji
INTRODUCTION
War is, by necessity, a savage and grisly
business and the decision to participate in armed
conflict is one of the most onerous any govern-
ment can make. This paper examines the domestic
norms and institutionalized procedures that
constrain or guide the office of prime minister of
Canada in deciding when and how to put Canada
in a state of war or armed conflict. This question
assumes greater importance and subtlety because
in contemporary times, formal declarations of war,
which in past would have followed intense
parliamentary debates, now seem anachronistic. In
modern times, states engage in armed conflicts,
whether aggressive1  or defensive, without
adopting the technical procedure of formally
"declaring" war on perceived enemy-states.
Indeed, so ubiquitous and recurrent is this
phenomenon of "undeclared warfare" that some
scholars have suggested that the technical concept
of war (declaration of war) has been effectively
replaced by the "factual concept of armed
conflict.",2 An obvious implication of this trend is
This article is dedicated to my friend, Manjeet. It is a condensed
and revised version of an earlier piece published by the Review
of Constitutional Studies. See Ikechi Mgbeoji, "Prophylactic
Use of Force in International Law: The Illegitimacy of
Canada's Participation in 'Coalition of the Willing' Without
United Nations Authorization and Parliamentary Sanction"
(2003) 8 Review of Constitutional Studies 169. The usual
disclaimers of responsibility apply.
On aggression, see Quincy Wright, "The Concept of
Aggression in International Law" (1935) 29 American Journal
of International Law 373.
Contemporary scholarship regarding international law on
warfare draws a distinction between war in the "technical"
sense and war in the "material" sense. The former pertains to
wars in which the state antagonists have formally declared war
against themselves, even if there is no violent clash. The latter
pertains to situations in which there is an eruption of hostilities
between states, even in the absence of a declaration of war. For
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that Canadians may not realize that their troops
may be engaged in armed conflicts somewhere
without as much as a prior parliamentary debate
on the necessity of otherwise of participating in an
armed conflict.
Further, in the aftermath of the Cold War,
incidents of use of force by states have increased.
What is indeed very worrisome about this trend is
that a whole range of dubious justifications has
been asserted by states as necessitating the use of
force. Some of the most ubiquitous justifications
include the alleged need to remove perceived
threats to international peace, 3 purported danger to
regional stability,4 or in some cases, the restoration
a fuller analysis, see Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and
Selfdefense, 3d ed., (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 9;
and Christopher Greenwood, "The Concept of War in Modern
International Law" (1987) 35 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 283.
C.G. Fenwick, "When Is There a Threat to Peace?" (1967) 61
American Journal of International Law 753; Louis Henkin,
"Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments
in International Law" (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 571.
Emmanuel Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and The
Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in
Liberia" (1994) 1:2 International Peacekeeping 1; Margaret
Vogts, ed., Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG. A Bold Attempt at
Peacekeeping (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing, 1992); George
Nolte, "Restoring Peace By Regional Action: International Law
Aspects of The Liberian Conflict" (1993) 53:3 Heidelberg
Journal of International Law 603; and Alhaji M.S. Bah,
"ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping: Unraveling the
Political Cleavages" (2000) 15:3 International Insights 61.
of "democracy" 5 to some troubled states. In some
other instances, states or groups of states have
used force to alleviate alleged humanitarian
crises.6 This liberal construction of the right to
resort to armed force in conflicts short of formal
warfare threatens the stability of the global order.7
Another factor that raises a profound issue as
to the legitimacy of such resort to armed force is
the shrinking number of Canadians who par-
ticipate in the domestic political processes leading
to the emergence of governing institutions,
especially at the federal level. In other words, an
overwhelming number of "governing majorities"
at the federal level are in fact governments that
represent less than half of the actual number of
votes cast at federal elections. Hence, the assum-
ption that the Prime Minister of Canada represents
the majority of the adult population of Canada is,
at best, unfounded. Therefore, a regime that
permits the Prime Minister to deploy Canadian
troops to situations of armed conflict without
parliamentary debate or approval, when in fact the
governing party garnered less than a majority of
the actual votes in the federal election, raises a
significant question about the powers of the prime
Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance" (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law
46; W. Michael Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention and
Fledging Democracies" (1995) 18 Fordham International Law
Journal 794; Stephen J. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment
As a Call To Democracy: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti,
Peru, and Guatemala" (1994) 25 University of Miami
International Law Review 393; Karsten Nowrot & Emily W.
Schabacker, "The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention
in Sierra Leone" (1998) 14 American Journal of International
Law 1; Malvina Halberstaam, "The Copenhagen Document:
Intervention in Support of Democracy" (1993) 34 Harvard
International Law Journal 163; Oscar Schachter, "The Legality
of Pro-Democratic Invasion" (1984) 78 American Journal of
International Law 645; and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, "The Place
and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law"
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 19.
Antonio Cassesse, "Ex Lnuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving
Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in The World Community?" (1999) 10
European Journal of International Law 23.
Rudiger Wolfrum, "The Contributions of Regional
Arrangements and Agencies to The Maintenance of
International Peace and Security: Possibilities and Limitations"
(1993) 53:3 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 576. A
related problem is the increasing inclination of the UN Security
Council to franchise out the authorization to states or groups of
states. See John Quigley, "The 'Privatization' of Security
Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism"
(1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 249; and
Richard Falk, "The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World
Order Precedent for the United Nations" (1995) 36 Harvard
International Law Journal 341.
minister in relation to Canadian participation in
armed conflicts.
Hence, a question that deserves careful
analysis is whether domestic legal institutions and
norms regulating use of force by states have
developed to accommodate changes in domestic
politics and international law with respect to
emerging state practice regarding use of force. If
the recent practice of the United Nations Security
Council' is an indicator of modern regulation of
use of force by states, it stands to reason that
domestic institutions and norms regulating use of
force by states are in need of bold rethinking. 9
This article briefly examines Canada's constitu-
tional processes regulating use of force by Canada
in its relations with other states. Although
international law and norms influence the
Canadian position on use of force in international
law, this article focuses on the internal domestic
law and institutions of Canada. I argue that
domestic laws and institutions regulating use of
force by Canada in its international relations are
wholly inadequate. There is simply too much
power in the office of the prime minister. Should
he or she decide to commit Canada to war, it
would seem that the only restraint on this power
would come from the ballot boxes. Yet, on further
analysis, the ballot boxes offer little solace. Since
World War I, for example, Canada has had fifteen
"majority" governments, but out of these
H. Freudenschuss, "Article 39 of The UN Charter Revisited:
Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the UN Security
Council" (1993) 46 Austrian Journal of Public International
Law 1.
Richard A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968); Bruno Simma, "NATO, the
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" (1999) 10 European
Journal of International Law 1; A. Mark Weisburd, Use of
Force. The Practice ofStates Since World War II (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univeristy Press, 1997); Antonio
Cassese, ed., The Current Legal Regulation On The Use of
Force (Dordretch, The Netherlands: Klumer Academic
Publishers, 1986); Noam Chomsky, "The Demolition of World
Order" Harper's Magazine (June 1999) 1517; B.S. Chimni,
International Law and World Order: A Critique of
Contemporary Approaches (London: Sage Publications, 1993);
Michael Reisman, "Unilateral Action and the Transformations
of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of
Humanitarian Intervention" (2000) 11 European Journal of
International Law 3; John Currie, "NATO's Humanitarian
Intervention in Kosovo: Making oi Breaking International
Law" (1998) 36 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 303;
Steve G. Simon, "The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention" (1993) 24 California Western
International Law Journal 1 17; and Ian Brownlie, "Thoughts of
Kind-Hearted Gunmen" in Richard B. Lillich, ed.,
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973) 139.
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governments, only four actually won a majority of
the popular votes cast. The simple fact is that
Canada has largely been ruled or governed by
parties with arguably phony majorities and phony
mandates. Hence, there is a need to rethink the
domestic political process, particularly in relation
to the power of the Prime Minister to place
Canada in situations of armed conflict.
For purposes of clarity and ease of analysis,
this article is divided into different parts. Part 1
examines the development of Canadian law and
political practices on the use of force in inte-
rnational relations. For purposes of convenience,
the analysis in Part 1 is developed through two
themes. The first theme deals with Crown
prerogative in matters of foreign relations and the
impact of legislative and judicial developments on
this difficult issue of law. The second theme
extends the arguments beyond the legal doctrine
of Crown prerogative to examine the legitimizing
function of parliamentary involvement in de-
cisions pertaining to the deployment of Canadian
personnel to areas of international conflict. I
divide the history of Canadian parliamentary
involvement in matters of war into four epochs:
the colonial era and Canada's position during
World War I (1914-1919), independent Canada
and World War II (1939-1945), the Korean
Conflict (1950-1953) and the United Nations (UN)
Charter (1945- present), and the first Gulf War
(1991).
With respect to the pre-UN Charter era,
Canada's domestic and international policy
reflected the progressive ideals of those committed
to outlawing war and promoted constraints on the
ability of states to use force in non-defensive
circumstances. More importantly, domestic
Canadian parliamentary practices in the pre-UN
Charter era evinced a cautious approach to the use
of force or participation by Canada in international
conflicts. Thus, the emergence of the UN,
empowered to secure global peace and security,
could be seen as an affirmation of Canadian
skepticism towards belligerency and recourse to
arms in settling conflicts."0
R. St. J. MacDonald, "The Relationship between International
and Domestic Law in Canada" in R. St. J. MacDonald, Gerald
L. Morris & Douglas M. Johnston, eds., Canadian Perspectives
on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974) 88.
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Regarding the UN Charter era, this watershed
in the development of international law on use of
force impacted Canadian domestic normative
order on participation in acts of belligerency.
Ultimately, Canada's original fidelity to the tenets
of the UN Charter earned it a reputation as an
honest broker."' However, in the aftermath of Cold
War politics, Canada's membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 12 and
geographical proximity to and special relationship
with the United States of America has placed it in
an awkward position on matters related to use of
force. In navigating this treacherous and intricate
situation, I argue that Canada's multilateralist
traditions and commitments to the UN Charter can
only have meaning if parliamentary and public
participation in decisions on when, how, and
where Canada participates in non-defensive armed
conflicts are regarded as constitutional
prescriptions rather than discretionary practices
dependent on the mood swings of the prime
minister. However, with a chronically weak
opposition in Parliament, and a palpable
democratic deficit arising from a "first-pass-the-
post" system that distorts the preferences of
Canadians, it would seem that the legitimacy of
cabinet decisions in matters of use of force by
Canada is very much in doubt.
PART 1: CROWN PREROGATIVE AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CANADA'S
PARTICIPATION IN ARMED
CONFLICTS
Originally, the position of the common law
was that the royal prerogative was immune from
judicial review.13 In Canada, the right to declare
war is a prerogative of the Crown. 14 The term
"Crown," in the juridical sense, refers collectively
to all the persons and institutions of the state that
lawfully act in the name of the Queen. In other
words, "Crown" is synonymous with the less
grandiose term "government." Dicey described
Gibran Van Ert, Using International Law In Canadian Courts
(The Hague: Klumer Law International, 2002).
12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 April 1949, 34 U.N .T.S.
243 (entered into force on 24 August 1949).
13 China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General, [1932] 2 K.B. 197
(C.A.).
14 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law (Concord, ON: Irwin
Law, 1997) at 62.
prerogative as the "residue of discretionary or
arbitrary authority, which at any given time is left
in the hands of the crown."' 5 Generally speaking,
in matters related to the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of war or of an armed
conflict, the Crown is acting in virtue of its powers
at both common law and outside of statutory
control and authority. In effect, when the Crown
acts in certain matters, it enjoys an unfettered and
unconditional discretion. Even where the matter of
going to war or engaging in armed conflict is
tabled before Parliament for a debate and vote,
there is no doubt that, legally, the Crown is not
bound by the result of such a vote. A
parliamentary debate on the wisdom, or lack
thereof, of going to war is a matter of political
politeness and tradition rather an event of any
juridical consequence. However, judicial
deference to Crown prerogative has yielded to a
regime of measured judicial review. 6 Hence, in
modern times, the prerogative of the Crown is not
a boundless power. As Professor Hogg has pointed
out, "the prerogative [of the Crown] is a branch of
the common law, because it is the decisions of the
courts which have determined its existence and
extent."17
Although the scope and extent of the Crown
prerogative has been somewhat limited by the
courts" and by some statutory provisions, 9 there
seems to be an unresolved question as to whether
the Crown's prerogative to declare war and make
peace on behalf of the Canadian state is, in
modern times, subject to judicial review. In the
celebrated GCCQ case, 2° the House of Lords, per
Lord Roskill, placed the "defence of the realm"
among those categories that "at present advised I
5 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study oJ the Law oJ the
Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1965) at 424.
Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 763
at 810 (H.L.), Lord Devlin [Chandler v. D.P.P.].
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed.,
looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997) at -14 [footnote
omitted].
Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441
[Operation Dismantle].
For example, under s. 32 (I) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Charter], cabinet decisions are reviewable. See G&rard V. La
Forest, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An
Overview" (1983) 61 Canadian Bar Review 19.
20 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister Jor the Civil
Service, [1985] 1 A.C. 374 (H.L.) [GCCQ].
do not think could properly be made the subject of
judicial review., 21 According to his Lordship:
Prerogative powers such as those relating
to the making of treaties, the defence of
the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the
granting of honours, the dissolution of
Parliament and the appointment of
ministers as well as others are not, I think,
susceptible to judicial review because
their nature and subject matter are such as
not to be amenable to the judicial process.
The courts are not the place wherein to
determine whether a treaty should be
concluded or the armed forces disposed in
a particular manner or Parliament
dissolved on one date rather than
another. 2
Clearly, in England it is settled law that
matters of foreign policy, including decisions by
the Crown on participation in acts of belligerency,
are beyond "judicial review" by the courts. 23
Indeed, the British government is not even legally
obliged to give reasons for its decisions on such
matters pertaining to foreign policy, 24 and the
courts in England do not have the authority to rule
upon the true meaning and effects of obligations
applying only at the level of international law.25
This, however, should be distinguished from the
narrower question of whether the Crown or its
agents or officers may act with impunity on
matters ostensibly within the rubric of Crown
prerogative. In other words, in the exercise of its
undoubted powers to initiate or plan armed
conflicts, the Crown is not above the law. As
pointedly noted by Lord Diplock in the GCCQ
case:
My Lords, that a decision of which the
ultimate source of power to make it is not
a statute but the common law (whether or
not the common law is for this purpose
given the label of "the prerogative") may
2 ibid. at 418.
Ibid.
R. v. Secretary qf State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
exparte Everett, [1989] 1 Q.B. 811 (C.A.); R. v. Secretary of
State for Foreign and Common wealth Aftairs, [2002] E.W .C.A.
Civ. 1598 (C.A.).
4 Stefan v. General Medical Council, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1293
(P.C.).
25 R v. Lyons, [2002] UKHL 44.
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be the subject of judicial review on the
ground of illegality is, I think, established
by the cases cited by my noble and
learned friend, Lord Roskill, and this
extends to cases where the field of law to
which the decision relates is national
security, as the decision of this House
itself in Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Lord
Advocate, 1964 S.C. (H.L.) 117 shows. 6
In effect, merely mentioning or invoking the
mantra of Crown prerogative does not
automatically dispose of the question. The courts
would have to examine the nature of the issues
raised and make a determination as to whether the
issues raised pertain to a reviewable act or not.
Where it is determined that the issues pertain to
the disposition of the armed forces of the Crown,
the decisions will be beyond judicial review.
However, when in the exercise of such
unreviewable prerogative power, neither the
Crown nor its agents operate above the law of the
land or binding international law. For example, no
one may successfully litigate the question of
whether the Crown was right to initiate an armed
conflict, but the military forces of the Crown are
not immune from prosecution if they commit war
crimes in the course of participating in that armed
conflict.
Turning back to the Canadian context, the
question that arises is whether the position in
English law is the same as in Canada. It would
seem that the position in Canada regarding the
ambit of Crown prerogative on matters of armed
conflict is somewhat unclear. 27 Legislative de-
velopments such as the NationalDefence Act28 and
the War Measures Act (when it was still in
effect),2 9 which encroach on Crown prerogative in
matters regarding defence of the realm, have
potentially extended the reach of judicial review.30
2, Supra note 20 at 411.
27 Van Ert, supra note 11 at 93.
M National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5.
The War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-2. For a judicial
interpretation of the act see R. v. Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150.
The act was in effect until 1988 when it was repealed by the
Emergencies Act, S.C. 1988, c. 29. See Hogg, supra note 17 at
17-22.
As Professor Monahan observes: "[t]he courts have held that
where a prerogative power has been regulated or defined by
statute, the statute in effect displaces the prerogative and the
Crown must act on the basis of the statutorily defined power"
(supra note 14 at 63). See Attorney General v. De Keyser's
Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.). Given that the
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As in England, however, it is now settled law in
Canada that where an exercise of Crown pre-
rogative breaches written laws, the courts will not
shirk from the duty of reviewing the Crown
prerogative in issue. Canadian courts in Air
Canada v. British Columbia (A.G.),31 Canada v.
Schmidt,32 United States of America v. Cotroni,
33
and United States v. Burns34 have displayed
unmistakable willingness to subject Crown
prerogative to judicial review, particularly where
such rights are protected by written law.
None of the authorities cited above deals
squarely with the justiciability35 of executive
decisions on Canadian participation in armed
conflicts. To the best of my knowledge, the only
case that may be of some relevance is the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Operation Dismantle
v. The Queen.36 The appellants alleged that the
decision of the federal cabinet to allow the United
States to test cruise missiles in Canadian airspace
violated their rights as enshrined in section 7 of
the Charter ofRights and Freedoms. The majority
of the Court dismissed the action on the grounds
that the alleged increased threat of nuclear war,
supposedly inherent in the tests, was predicated on
speculative hypothesis. However, the Court was
clear that cabinet-made foreign policy decisions of
the government are justiciable where such
decisions are alleged to infringe the rights of
Canadians or persons resident in Canada. This
would seem to accord with the distinctions made
in respect of the law on the same subject in
England.
However, the reasoning of the Court is
somewhat difficult to follow. The plurality of the
Court indicated that judicial restraint from review
of such decisions is premised on the theory that
proof of facts in support of justiciability of such
claims would be nigh impossible. In the words of
the majority of the Court:
provisions of the Emergencies Act relate to issues of domestic
integrity, security and territorial integrity of Canada, I will
avoid further analysis of this legislation and its possible
implications for the subject under analysis.
31 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539.
32 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
33 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
34 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7.
31 In the United States, the issue of justiciability of"political"
questions is often vexed. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939).
3 Supra note 18.
Since the foreign policy decisions of
independent and sovereign nations are not
capable of prediction, on the basis of
evidence, to any degree of certainty
approaching probability, the nature of
such reactions can only be a matter of
speculation; the causal link between the
decision of the Canadian government to
permit the testing of the cruise [missiles]
and the results that the appellants allege
could never be proven.3
These comments reflect the view of Lord
Radcliffe in Chandler v. D.P.P.3 regarding the
ability of the courts to review the complex host of
factors that come into play when a parliamentary
cabinet decides on whether to participate in
international conflicts. However, Madam Justice
Wilson anchored her decision on the self-made
propriety of judicial review rather than the
fictional inability of the courts to review such
cabinet decisions. In her words:
[If we are to look at the Constitution for
the answer to the question whether it is
appropriate for the courts to "second
guess" the executive on matters of
defence, we would conclude that it is not
appropriate. However, if what we are
being asked to do is to decide whether the
particular act of the executive violates the
rights of the citizens, then it is not only
appropriate that we answer the question;




It would therefore seem that a cabinet decision
placing Canada in a state of armed conflict is not
justiciable per se, but maybe judicially scrutinized
where there is evidence to support the claim that
the execution of such a cabinet decision has
infringed the rights of Canadians in circumstances
that are not demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society. In sum, the Crown prerogative
on matters of war remains intact, albeit with some
modicum of judicial inroads.
In the absence of authority in support of
judicial review of the Crown's prerogative to
3 Operation Dismantle, supra note 18 at 467.
31 Supra note 16.
31 Operation Dismantle, supra note 18 at 472.
place Canada in armed conflicts, Crown
prerogative in such matters may be politically
constrained by parliamentary practices and demo-
cratic norms. Although these practices do not have
the juridical character of customary law such as
their equivalents have in international law, they
embody accepted codes of conduct impacting on
the legitimacy of decisions to situate Canada in
armed conflicts. Crown prerogative in matters of
armed conflicts, at least in the political sphere, is
not a blank cheque. Theoretically, democracy and
parliamentary practices are designed to curb
executive rascality and impetuosity, particularly in
matters as grave as use of force.
The absence of explicit constitutional
constraints on Crown prerogative to declare war is
derived from Canada's constitutional heritage
(inherited from British constitutional conven-
tions), whereby "political leaders could be trusted
to exercise power in a restrained and responsible
fashion. 40 The reverse could be said to be the case
in the United States where laws are designed to
curb executive propensity for war.4' In the U.S., it
is arguable that the separation of powers is stricter
and thus the courts are institutionally leery of
second-guessing the competence of Congress to
42declare war and make peace.
The trusting relationship in Canada is
probably reciprocal and is ostensibly founded on
the Kantian notion that a parliamentary regime
with the restraints of democratic and responsible
governance would be less likely to use force in
international relations unless there are clear,
justifiable and compelling circumstances to
warrant such momentous decisions. The theory is
that only an irresponsible government would
disregard informed public opinion or
parliamentary participation when formulating
40 Monahan, supra note 14 at 17.
41 Louis Henkin, "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?"
(1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 597.
Martin H. Redish, "Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of the Judicial Function" (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal.
71; Fritz W. Scharpf, "Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis" (1966) 75 Yale Law Journal.
517; and Melville Fuller Weston, "Political Questions" (1925)
38 Harvard Law Review 296. The issue of justiciability of the
so-called "political questions" other than war has met with
mixed results in the United States. The presence of clear
constitutional restraints on executive forays into belligerency
has not stopped the government of United States from
participating in wars without express Congressional declaration
of war.
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decisions regarding deployment of Canadians to
an armed conflict. If such a government were to be
so reckless, there would probably be a heavy
political price to pay for such folly.
With mounting evidence of increased power
in the hands of the Prime Minister 43 vis-A-vis an
impotent and fractious opposition in the Canadian
political system, it is doubtful whether Canada's
imprudent trust in executive good faith on such an
extraordinary matter as use of force in
international relations is not unduly naive and
long-overdue for a rethink. Although the decision
to use force in international relations may, in some
circumstances, become a potential subject of
judicial review, the importance of popular
participation in parliamentary debates on issues of
when, how, and where Canada uses force in
international relations seems to be in the realm of
political legitimacy rather than juridical validity.
Needless to say, to ensure that Canada is not
heedlessly plunged into conflicts, a crucial factor
is a vibrant, responsive, and alert Parliament. It
therefore follows that in examining the probative
value to be attached to the processes that yield
Canada's decisions to play a role in international
conflicts, regard must be had to certain factors
including the quality of the debate in the
Parliament, the power of the caucus, the potency
of the opposition parties, and more importantly,
the extent to which popular votes are reflected in
the makeup of the Parliament itself. It is now
apposite to evaluate the extent to which "majority"
governments in Canada actually reflect the
number of votes cast.
PART 2: ARMED CONFLICTS AND
CANADA'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
In theory, democracies are, inter alia,
supposed to have good voting systems. A good
voting system in turn yields democratic rep-
resentation. Democratic representation must treat
all votes cast equally, produce fair results, and
make every vote count. Hence, where a voting
system distorts the votes cast or fudges the
Some commentators have made legitimate observations to the
effect that Canada is witnessing an increase of power in the
hands of the Prime Minister and a "decay of Parliament." See
Wes Pue, "The Chretien Legacy" Parkland Post 6:4 (Winter
2002) 1.
FORUM CONSTITUTIONNEL (2005) 14:2
message sent by the voting public, such a
democracy suffers a deficit of legitimacy. A sober
analysis of the voting system in Canada vis-A-vis
Canadian participation in armed conflicts reveals
a shocking level of democratic deficit and gross
distortion of voter preference. By force of logic,
governments "elected" by distorted voter tab-
ulation may be said to have questionable
legitimacy and, consequently, the decisions of
such governments to place Canada in armed
conflict is hobbled by questions of legitimacy. Of
the fifteen governments Canada has had since
World War I, only four had true majorities. These
were the governments elected in the federal
elections of 1940, 1949, 1958, and 1984. In fact,
the 1997 Liberal government was formed with
only 39 percent of the popular vote. The long list
of phony "majorities" at the federal elections
include the 1930, 1935, 1945, 1953, 1968, 1974,
1980, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 elections.
The problem is that Canada maintains an
antiquated and discredited voting system - called
first-past-the-post.
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This system distorts the character of the actual
votes cast, treats votes unequally, and wastes a
considerable number of votes. How then does this
voting system impact on Canada's participation in
armed conflicts? Generally speaking, virtually all
engagements of Canada in armed conflicts have
been the product of parliamentary debates. Hence,
if parliamentary debates and votes on matters
related to armed conflict are to have normative
weight, the composition of the Parliament must at
the very least, represent the voter preference and
public opinion of Canadians. It is now pertinent to
examine Canadian parliamentary practices re-
garding use of force since 1914 to the present date.
CANADA AND WORLD WAR 1(1914-1918)
In 1914, Canada was a colony of the United
Kingdom. This historical factor heavily influenced
the political legitimacy of the circumstances in
For a fuller discussion on Canada's democratic deficit see
Jeffrey Simpson, The Friendly Dictatorship (Toronto,
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 2001); and Richard Simeon,
"Recent Trends in Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations
in Canada: Lessons for the UK?" (354) The Round Table (April
1, 2000) at 231-43.
which Canada participated in that war.41 It is
therefore not surprising that the political processes
preceding Canadian participation in World War I
seemed to be a rehash of parliamentary develop-
ments and events in the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, like other British colonies, Canada
joined the war on 4 August 1914, the same day as
the United Kingdom. It is significant that the
colonial government in Canada took certain steps
to legitimize, at least in the court of public
opinion, Canada's participation in that war.
First, on 4 August 1914, the Canadian
government "issued an Order-in-Council
proclaiming that Canada was at war ' 4 with
Germany. What is interesting here is that although
Parliament was not sitting at the time when war
broke out between Great Britain and Germany,
Parliament was reconvened on 18 August 1914. It
was on that day that after hearing the Governor-
General's speech in the Senate Chamber, the
Canadian government issued an order-in-council
proclaiming that Canada was at war and created
war-related measures.4 7 Second, the decision to go
to war was debated in the Parliament, and, in a
normative sense, it is correct to say that there was
popular input to the government's ultimate
decision to join the conflict on the side of Great
Britain. It would therefore seem that these
measures conferred legitimacy on Canada's
participation in the war of 1914-18. Shortly after
the First World War, there was a heightened
global movement towards arbitration of disputes
and possibly, the outlawing of war.48 Greater
emphasis was placed on the former and thus a
decision as to whether to engage in war was to be
predicated on a failure of honest and serious
attempts at pacific settlement of disputes. This
understanding was reflected in the Pact of the
League of Nations.
CANADA AND WORLD WAR 11 (1939-1945)
Michel Rossignol, International Conflicts: Parliament, The
National Dejence Act, and the Decision to Participate (Ottawa:
Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 1992), online: Library
of Parliament, Parlianentary Information and Research Service
<www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp303-e.htm>.
46 ibid. at 2.
4' House of Commons Debates (19 August 1914).
4 For an account of this epochal development in international
law, see Hans Weliberg, The Outlawry of War, trans. by Edwin
H. Zeydel (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1951).
By 1939, when the Second World War broke
out, Canada was an independent state. However,
formal political independence from Great Britain
hardly severed or diminished existing economic,
cultural and diplomatic ties between Great Britain
and Canada. It was therefore natural that Canada
would have strong sympathies with Great Britain
when the latter declared war on Germany on 3
September 1939 after Germany had invaded
Poland on 1 September 1939. It is hardly debat-
able that Canada's preference to join the war a few
days after Great Britain was calculated to create
the impression that Canada was an independent
political entity and no longer tied to Great
Britain.49 Consequently, Canada allowed ten days
to elapse before jumping into the fray.
What is significant for the purposes of our
analysis in this article is the domestic political
process that culminated in the exercise of Crown
prerogative to declare war on Germany. A few
facts are crucial for our analysis. First, when the
war started in Europe, Parliament was not in
session. Indeed, Parliament was not scheduled to
resume before 2 October 1939;however, owing to
the emergency, Parliament was summoned on 7
September 1939. Great Britain had already been at
war with Germany since 3 September 1939. After
the Governor-General read the Speech from the
Throne, parliamentary debates on the war were
held from the 8 September until 10 September
1939.50 Both chambers of Parliament debated and
approved the motion for formal declaration of war
on Germany.51 What is very significant here is that
parliamentary debate preceded the order-in-
council declaring war. This procedure was also
followed when war was declared on Italy in
1940.52 It is thus correct to assert that from 1939 to
1940, Canada followed a pattern of debate in
Parliament before using force in its international
relations. Interestingly, the 1940 federal election
produced a true majority government.
However, this pattern of parliamentary debate
prior to Canadian engagement in armed conflicts
was broken in the course of a subsequent increase
of belligerent states in that conflict and Canada's
J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics oJ the Mackenzie
King Government, 1939 1945 (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1975).
House of Commons Debates (9 September 1939).
House oJ Commons Debates (11 September 1939).
2 House oJ Commons Debates (10 June 1940).
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use of force against Japan, Hungary, Romania, and
Finland, countries which had aligned with
Germany in World War II. With particular
reference to Japan, Parliament had been adjourned
since 14 November 1941 and was not scheduled to
resume sitting until 21 January 1942. In the
interval, on 7 December 1941, Japan bombed
Pearl Harbor. Although there was a special sitting
of the two houses, it was not for the purposes of
debating any war resolution on Japan but to hear
an "address to the Canadian Parliament by the
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill."53
Parliament resumed sitting on the date scheduled,
21 January 1942, and discussed a proclamation of
war on Japan dated 8 December 1941. The
proclamation purported that Canada had been at
war with Japan as of 7 December 1941. For the
first time in Canadian constitutional history, the
country was engaging in conflict without prior
parliamentary debate and approval.54
Similar proclamations that had been backdated
to 7 December 1941 were made with respect to
Hungary, Romania, and Finland, which had all
joined the Axis coalition. Prime Minister
Mackenzie King justified this untidy procedure
with the argument that belligerency with respect
to Hungary, Romania, and Finland were "all part
of the same war."55 Remarkably, records of
parliamentary debates on this issue support the
position of the Prime Minister, as none of the
opposition parties questioned the normative
import of the precedent set by Prime Minister
King. Given that there were subsequent
ratifications of the declarations of war against the
allies of Germany, there is little doubt that the
declarations of war on these allies of Japan and
Germany would have been quickly approved if
they had been tabled before Parliament prior to the
actual engagement of hostilities.
As Rossignol observes, "Canadian public
opinion accepted that Canada had no choice but to
maintain its war effort against the continued
aggression of Germany, Japan and Italy and their
allies. 56  Even the pacifist Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party that had
maintained its opposition to Canadian parti-
Rossignol, supra note 44 at 5.
4 House oJ Commons Debates (22 January 1942).
C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict. A History of
Canada's External Policies, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1981) at 320.
Rossignol, supra note 45 at 6.
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cipation in the war yielded ground on this issue.
Speaking for the CCF party in Parliament on 10
June 1940, M.J. Coldwell observed that "[tfhis
war is none of our seeking; it is thrust upon us.
And we have no option it seems to me, but to
accept the challenge and to go forward to ultimate
victory., 57 However, some Canadians, particularly
Professor Frank Scott, were appalled at the
government's politics in respect of parliamentary
debate and retroactive approval of Canada's use of
force in international relations. In a letter to Prime
Minister Mackenzie King in 1939, Professor Scott
complained that "a group of individuals took so
many steps to place Canada in a state of active
belligerency before Parliament met ... you very
greatly limited Canadian freedom of action to
decide what course to follow.
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In reply to Professor Scott's quarrels with the
politics of Canadian participation in some aspects
of the war without prior parliamentary approval,
some commentators like Michel Rossignol have
argued that Professor Scott probably misread
Canadian public opinion on the issue. According
to Rossignol:
While Professor Scott thought that
Parliament had been ignored, other
Canadians would have been angered by
any government delay in rallying to
Britain's side as soon as war broke out. In
other words, there were opposing views
on the importance of Parliament's role in
the process. The government, by insisting
on reconvening Parliament before actually
declaring war, had asserted Parliament's
importance in the political process, and
this was generally accepted by
Canadians.59
It would seem that Rossignol has misconceived
the kernel of Professor Scott's argument. Scott's
grouse is with the procedure rather than
presumptions about whether the public would
have ultimately approved Canada's use of force.
In any event, the Canadian public owes no
gratitude to government for tabling such weighty
issues for parliamentary discussion. The decision
to use force in international relations is the most
17 House ofCommons Debates (10 June 1940) at 653.
Stacey, supra note 55 at 10.
Granatstein, supra note 49 at 26; Rossignol, supra note 45 at 6.
important decision and given that it is the public
that bears the financial and emotional costs of
such decisions, government is obliged to engage
with public input. Secondly, although the
Canadian government may, under conditions of an
extreme emergency, place Canada in an active
state of belligerency without prior parliamentary
approval, there is doubt whether Canada's wars
against Finland, Japan, Romania, and Hungary fell
under this category. If Parliament had the time and
patience to sit down and listen to Prime Minister
Churchill, what stopped it from engaging in the
more important task of debating Canada's
proposed wars against Finland, Romania, and
Hungary? More importantly, Rossignol's
arguments seem to ignore the symbolic value of
parliamentary participation in such momentous
decisions as use of force by the state. Even if the
outcome of such parliamentary process is a
foregone conclusion, due process and legitimate
governance require fidelity to such conventions.
THE UN CHARTER, CANADA AND THE KOREAN
CRISIS (1950-1953)
The end of World War II ushered in a new era
of international norms, particularly on the threat of
use of force in international relations. In the
course of parliamentary debates on the nature of
Canada's participation in the Korean conflict,
Prime Minister St. Laurent strongly argued:
Any participation by Canada in carrying
out the foregoing resolution (the UN
Security Council Resolution) - and I wish
to emphasize this strongly - would not be
participation in war against any state. It
would be our part in collective police
action under the control and authority of
the United Nations for the purpose of
restoring peace to an area where an
aggression has occurred as determined
under the charter of the United Nations
by the security council, which decision
has been accepted by us.6"
From the foregoing, it is clear that both the Prime
Minister and Parliament were clear that if Canada
was to participate in the operation in the Korean
House of Commons Debates (30 June 1950) at 4459 [emphasis
added].
peninsula, it was doing so as part of the collective
police action under the auspices of the UN
Security Council rather than as a belligerent act
orchestrated by a group of states acting outside the
authority of the United Nations Security Council.
More importantly, there was a definite
commitment on the part of the Prime Minister to
submit the question of Canada's participation in
the enforcement action to parliamentary debate.
According to Prime Minister St. Laurent:
If the situation in Korea or elsewhere,
after prorogation [of Parliament], should
deteriorate and action by Canada beyond
that which I indicated should be
considered, Parliament will immediately
be summoned to give the new situation
consideration.61
Although Parliament did not "pass a motion
specifically dealing with the government's
decision concerning Canadian participation in
U.N. police action in Korea, 6 2 the desirability of
Canadian participation in the enforcement action
was raised in Parliament on 26 and 30 June 1950,
and on 29 August 1950. Clearly, notwithstanding
the added layer of the UN regime to the law on
use of force by states, the Canadian political
process made room for debate on whether Canada
ought to participate in the Korean conflict. Thus,
this era demonstrates how Canada adopted its
tradition of domestic debate prior to, or
immediately after, the use of force, to defer to the
authority of the Security Council as the ultimate
supervisor and executor in matters related to non-
defensive use or threat of use of force in
international relations.6 3
THE GULF WAR, CANADA, AND THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE U N SECURITY COUNCIL (1991)
Given that the enforcement action to remove
Iraq from Kuwait (and no more) was sanctioned
by the UN, there was no need for a declaration of
war against Iraq. But there was need for a
parliamentary debate of the issues. In addition, it
was within the powers of the governor-in-council,
ibid.
62 Rossignol, supra note 45 at 9.
61 As Rossignol has argued, "Canada has always strongly
supported the United N ations and championed collective action
to ensure international peace." ibid. at 11.
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without recalling Parliament, to authorize other
actions taken by Canada in pursuance of the
resolutions made by the UN Security Council.
Moreover, since 1992, the United Nations Act
64
and Special Economic Measures Act 65 made it
easier for the government to adopt and enforce
emergency 66 measures without Parliament being
recalled. The determination of whether or not an
emergency exists is the responsibility of
Parliament. The troubling question here is whether
these two legislative provisions have avoided
domestic parliamentary debate and Canadian
public participation in military activities.
Even when the Security Council has
authorized such military measures, it would be
desirable that the Canadian populace should have
a place in the debates leading to the deployment of
Canadian personnel to zones of conflict. Although
Canada is obliged to comply with UN Security
Council resolutions authorizing enforcement
actions, it should also strive to scrutinize the
motives and intentions of the permanent members
of the Security Council, lest it sheepishly follow
the Council in lending credibility to an illegitimate
use of force. It is hardly debatable that the best
way to ensure legitimate participation in UN
enforcement actions is to subject any decision to
send Canadian troops to any international
conflicts, particularly those thickly enmeshed in
power politics and the economic self-interests of
members of the Security Council, to rigorous
parliamentary and public debate.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that Canadian
democratic practices as evidenced in both pre-UN
Charter and post-UN Charter regimes support the
view that Canada has hardly participated in an
international conflict without parliamentary
debate, approval and/or ratification. In other
words, Canadian participation in armed conflicts
is often a function of parliamentary approval. The
question raised by this practice or convention is
whether such parliamentary approval is a legal
R.S.C. 1985, c. U-2.
S.C. 1992, c. 17.
6 The National Dcfence Act defines emergency as "war, invasion,
riot or insurrection, real or apprehended." Supra note 28, s. 2.
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obligation on the part of the government.6 7 The
short answer is that it is primarily a political
obligation with implications for governmental
legitimacy.
More importantly, Parliament has an
undeniable role in reviewing the government's
decision concerning Canadian participation in the
use of force in international relations. Therefore,
the question of Canadian participation cannot be
a function of executive discretion. Canadian
vigilance cannot be guaranteed unless Parliament
is a potent and vibrant institution for the
articulation of public concerns and interests. In
this context, the chronic impotence of both the
ruling party caucus and opposition parties in
Parliament give reason for concern. As Professor
Wes Pue has pointed out, Canadian democracy is
increasingly becoming dysfunctional.68
With an electoral system designed to distort
voter preferences, the development of de facto
one-party government, the ascendancy of the
prime minister and massive concentration of
power in one man's control, and the decline of
Parliament and caucus, 69an effective parliamentary
role in the decision to engage in armed conflicts is
practically non-existent. A reappraisal of these
shortcomings in Canadian democracy would not
only reinforce the rights of the public to have their
input considered through their elected
representatives, but would also afford a needed
measure of legitimacy and responsiveness in how
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